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The Constitutionality of Airport Searches
It became clear in the late 1960's that the novel crime of airplane
hijacking not only posed particularly grave dangers, but was also
unusually difficult to prevent. An immediate and effective response
was required. The current airport search system was developed to fill
this need. Since it was instituted, the number of skyjackings has been
greatly reduced,1 and most observers attribute this reduction to the
effectiveness of the procedures.
However, airport searches, which are not presently done under
the authority of a warrant, may present problems under the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.2
I. From 1961 through 1967, there were only seven air hijackings in the United
States. In 1968, however, 18 American and 12 foreign airplanes were hijacked. In 1969,
there were $0 hijacking attempts-of which 33 were successful-involving American
airplanes and 46 attempts-of which 37 were successful-on foreign airplanes. Since
1969, the number of hijackings has decreased each year. In 1970, there were only 26
attempted hijackings-of which 18 were successful-in this country, and another 58
attempts-with 38 successes-in the rest of the world. In 1971, America suffered 2'1 at•
tempted hijackings-with only 12 successful-and there were 32 attempts-with 11
successful-on foreign planes. McGinley &: Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A
Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 293, 294-95 (1972). In 1972, there were 21
attempted hijackings in this country-of which only 10 were successful-and there
were 31 attempts-with 10 successes-in the rest of the world. As of November 1,
there had been only 2 hijacking attempts in the United States in 1973, and only one of
those succeeded. Telephone interview with Mr. David Hess, Information Specialist,
News Division, FAA, November 27, 1973.
2. In interpreting the fourth amendment the Supreme Court has ruled that, generally, "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). In addition to the amendment's requirements ol
probable cause and particularity the warrant must be issued by "a neutral anll ck•
tached magistrate." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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The number of cases contesting the constitut,ionality of airport
searches has greatly increased during the past year,3 but the courts
have often failed to give the questions presented the careful analysis
that they deserve. To date, most decisions, citing "the overwhelming
societal ihterest created by the imminent danger of passenger
deaths, " 4 have held that the searches do not violate the fourth amendment. 6 A few courts, however, have maintained that established
search and seizure law simply cannot be stretched far enough to
approve these searches in their present form. 6 This Note will discuss
airport searches in· comparison to several situations in which the
courts have found that the requirements of the fourth amendment
do not apply or are satisfied even in the absence of a warrant: border
searches, administrative searches, stop-and-frisk searches, and searches
under express or implied consent. None of these are perfectly analogous to the present airport procedures. Therefore, if airport searches
are to be allowed, either the procedures must be modified to fit the
established exceptions, or a new exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment must be created.
Airplane hijacking became a major problem in 1968,7 when there
were eighteen successful attempts, and 1969, when there were forty
attempts, thirty-three of which were successful.8 In response to this
new danger, the government took both regulatory and legislative
action. In late 1968, a special Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
3, In the federal courts, approximately 12 airport search cases were tried from 1969
through 1972. From January through June 1973, another 11 airport search decisions
have been reported, and there are almost certainly others that have not yet been published.
4. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1095 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Legato, 42 U.S.L.W. 2019 (5th Cir., June 14, 1973); United
States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Oct., 9,
1973); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Epperson,
454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (must show actual
consent to search); United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973) (search may become unreasonable if its scope expands beyond what is reasonable considering its
purposes); United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir, 1973) (must show compelling circumstances to justify airport searches); United States v. Meulener, 351 F.
Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (in order to prove consent must show defendant knew he
could avoid the search by not boarding).
Many observers are particularly concerned that fewer than 20 per cent of the arrests
resulting from airport searches have involved crimes related to hijacking. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 2, 1971, at 1, col. 3 (late city ed.). Over one third of the arrests not related to hijacking were for possession of narcotics, approximately another one third involved
aliens illegally in the United States, and the remainder were distributed among a wide
variety of other offenses.
7. After the first hijacking of an American commercial aircraft in 1961, see J . .AREY,
THE SKY PIRATES 49-55 (1972), Congress passed a statute that, for the first time, made
aircraft hijacking and certain related activities federal crimes. Act of Sept. 5, 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-197, § 1, 75 Stat, 466 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ I472(i)-(m) (1970)).
8. McGinley &: Downs, supra note I, at 295.
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Task Force, in cooperation with the commercial carriers, developed
and implemented the initial antihijacking system,9 and the government provided United States deputy marshals and customs agents
to carry out the searches.10 In 1970, by special Presidential directive,
the searches were extended to all "appropriate" airports.11 Participation in the search procedure had initially been voluntary on the part
of the airlines, but on February I, 1972, the FAA issued a rule that
required airlines to screen all commercial passengers themselves. 12
Most of the cases that have been decided to date arose under these
early guidelines. Although the original system varied in its application, it was essentially a series of increasingly intrusive and stringent
screening procedures. In a typical search, airline personnel would
first apply a Hijacker Profile, developed by a task force of representatives from several federal agencies,13 to all passengers as they checked
in, and special markings would be put on the tickets of the "selectees."14 At the boarding gate, all passengers were required to walk
through a magnetometer (metal detector); in some cases only the
"selectees" were actually monitored.15 If a passenger triggered the
device, airline personnel would ask for identification. If he failed to
pro9-uce satisfactory identification, a marshal was summoned, who
would repeat the request.16 The selectee would be asked if he were
wearing .or carrying any metal and would then be asked to pass
through the magnetometer a second time.17 Only if he again triggered
the device would he be asked to submit to a "voluntary" frisk. 18 The
passenger's hand baggage might also be searched.19 Each successive
intrusion was conditioned on the passenger's failure to satisfy the
9. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 898-99 (9th Cir. 1973); Hearings on Aircraft
Hijacking Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong,, 2d Sess, 80
'(1970) [hereinafter Hearings].
IO. Hearings, supra note 9, at 80, 92.
11. 1970 PUBLIC PAPERS OF PRF.5IDENTS OF 'rllE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON 742-43
(1971).
12. 37 Fed. Reg. 2500-01 (1972) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 121,538 (1973)). The new
rule required air carriers to adopt a screening system "acceptable" to t11c FAA. Such
a system would require tlie screening of all airline passengers "by one or more of
tlie following systems: behavioral profile, magnetometer, identification check, physical
search." FAA Press Release No. 72-26, Feb. 6, 1972.
13. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The details
of tlie profile are secret, but tlie government has revealed that tlie characteristics arc
based on a detailed study of all known hijackers. The characteristics are ostensibly
concerned with tlie behavioral patterns of embarking passengers, rather than with
any racial or social traits. 328 F. Supp, at 1086-87.
14. McGinlcy &: Downs, supra note 1, at 303-04.
15. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1973).
16. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
. 17; United States v; Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
18. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
19. United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1181 (3d Cir. 1972).
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preceding check, and at each step the majority of the passengers were
cleared for boarding without further search.20
Hijacking attempts continued, although with reduced success,21
and the FAA decided that more rigorous searches were necessary. On
December 5, 1972, it ordered airlines to subject all passengers to a
magnetometer screening and a search of carry-on items, as well as to
the Hijacker Profile. The airlines were to conduct these searches with
their own personnel or with private security guards, but armed law
enforcement officers were to be present at all times.22 This new procedure abolished the successive screening that was the basis of the
original system. No passenger was considered cleared until he had
passed through all three stages.
Before these procedures are evaluated in terms of the fourth
amendment, it should be pointed out that two other constitutional
problems may be raised in cases involving airport searches. First,
when the validity of the profile is in question,23 the courts have used
in camera hearings to ensure its continued secrecy.24 The defendant
and the public are excluded from these hearings, although the defendant's counsel is present. It has been alleged that this procedure
denies the defendant his right to a public trial, his right to confronta20. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
21. See note I supra.
22. Dept. of Transportation Press Release No. 103-72, Dec. 5, 1972.
23. The courts have not even attempted to answer the question of whether the
profile is accurate or effective if used correctly. In fact, approximately 14 out of every
15 people who meet the profile and are searched are found to have no weapon.
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Also, one commentator
has argued, there is always the risk that even a theoretically sound system will be
misused: "[P]ermitting any use of certain mathematical methods entails a sufficiently
high risk of misuse, or a risk of misuse sufficiently costly to avoid, that it would be
irrational not to take such misuse into account when deciding whether to permit
the methods to be employed at all." Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1329, 1331 (1971).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). It can be argued that
the profile violates the requirement of equal protection implicit in the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp, 1077,
1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Since in camera hearings have maintained the secrecy of the
characteristics used, it is impossible to determine whether they involve a suspect
classification or whether they bear a rational relationship to the government's purpose. However, at least one court that has held an in camera hearing on the subject
has found that the distinctions made by the profile "do not discriminate against
any group on the basis of religion, origin, political views, or race. They are precisely
designed to select only those who present a high probability of being dangerous."
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Lopez, however,
demonstrates that a secret profile can easily be abused. In that case, an airline official
had, without authority, issued an order· that modified the profile and introduced an
ethnic clement for which there was no experimental basis. Since defendant had been
selected by this altered profile, the court held that his constitutional rights had been
violated, suppressed the evidence found during the search, and dismissed the indictment against him.
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tion of the witnesses against him, and his right to the effective
assistance of counsel, all of which are guaranteed by the sixth amendment.25 In determining if these rights have been unconstitutionally
impaired, the courts look to the extent to which they have been
infringed and the strength of the public interest involved in the
activity called into question.26 The validity of the procedure has been
upheld in airport search cases because of the "serious danger" that
if "even one characteristic of the 'profile' [were] generally revealed,
the system could be seriously undermined by hijackers fabricating an
acceptable profile."27 In recent cases the scope of in camera proceedings in airport search cases has been strictly limited in order to avoid
unnecessary infringement on the defendant's rights.28 The courts
have emphasized the fact that the earlier cases were justified only by
the need to keep the profile secret and have reversed convictions
where the in camera portions of the hearings dealt with subjects
unrelated to the profile.
A second constitutional objection that may be raised in relation
to airport searches involves the right to travel.29 Although this right is
not explicitly guaranteed by any provision of the Constitution,30 the
Supreme Court has recognized that it is fundamental. 31 In response
to the charge that the right to travel is unconstitutionally infringed
by the airport search system, it might first be argued that the search
system does not burden travel unreasonably. This is not to say that
travel must be completely prohibited before the right is infringed;
the Court has stated that mere penalization is sufficient to make an
infringement unconstitutional.82 For instance, the denial of welfare
benefits to those who have not lived in a state for a year,88 and the
25. For more extensive discussions of this problem, see United States v. Lopez,
328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); McGinley &: Downs, supra note 1, at 31618; Note, Skyjackings: Constitutional Problems Raised by Anti-Hijacking Systems,
63 J. CRIM, L. C, &: P. S. 356, 357-60 (1972).
26. United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 725•26 (2d Cir. 1973); United States
v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 672 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United States v.
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1087-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
27. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also
United States v. Miller, 480 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Slocum, 464
F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States V, Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert, denied,
409 U.S. 991 (1972).
28. United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973); United States V,
Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973).

--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~

(1972).
30. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
31. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 633-38 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966); Edwards v. Cali•
fornia, 314 U.S. 160, 196-77 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-44
(1867).
32. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-42 (1972).
33. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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denial of the right to register to vote to those who have not resided
in the state for one year and in the county for three months,34 have
both been found to be impermissible burdens on the right to travel.
It is unlikely, however, that the courts ·will find that the "minor ...
indignity incident to an airport search"35 is a similarly unreasonable
burden. The intrusion caused by the use of the magnetometer is
"quite minimal,"36 as is that caused by the use of the profile, and
"the inconvenience of a pat-dmm is so minor"37 that, as one court has
suggested, the procedures are not "a resented intrusion on privacy,
but, instead, a welcome reassurance of safety."38 Moreover, for those
who find the airport search overly objectionable, other means of
transportation are available.39
Even if the right to travel is found to be burdened, it would be
argued that the infringement is constitutional in that it is justified
by a compelling state interest.40 In a case involving the right to travel
outside the country, the Courf analogized to the protected freedom
to travel within the United States and pointed out that the right to
travel "does not mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire or pestilence
cannot be quarantined when it can be demonstrated that unlimited
travel to the area would directly and materially interfere with the
safety and welfare of the area or the Nation as a whole."41 The airport
searches constitute a smaller imposition on the traveling public than
34. Dunn v. Blumstein, 45 U.S. 330 (1972).
35. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1973).
36. United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir. 1973).
37. United States v. Rivera, 72 CR 1309, slip op. at 10 (E.D.N.Y., May 22, 1973).
38. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 947 (1972). Some courts have viewed the search procedures differently. "[T]he
intrusion which the airport search imposes on the public is not insubstantial. It is
inconvenient and annoying, in some cases it may be embarrassing, and at times it can
be incriminating." United States v. Skipwith, No. 72-1932, slip op. at 6 (5th Cir.,
June 14, 1973). The Skipwith court did ultimately conclude that the searches were
justifiable.
39. "There is no inherent right to travel to a certain place in a particular aircraft." United States v. Fern, No. 72-1284, slip op. at 7 (7th Cir., Sept. 20, 1973)
(Gordon, J., dissenting). It can be argued that Judge Gordon overstates the law.
Some commentators view the right to travel as a right of personal mobility. See, e.g.,
z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTlTUTION OF 1787, at 188-93 (1956). To
the extent that airport searches deter people from using airplanes, they would seem
to restrict an individual's mobility.
40. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 333, 338-42 (1972). The first Supreme Court
case that strictly scrutinized governmental action and found it justified by a finding
of a compelling interest was Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In that
case, national security provided a compelling federal interest. Recently, in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973), the Court explicitly found that the state has a
compelling interest in the life of a mother after three months of pregnancy and in
the fetus after it attains viability. Dicta in another recent case, In re Griffiths, 41
U.S.L.W. 5143, 5145 (U.S., June 25, 1973), suggests that a state may have a compelling interest in maintaining the high standards of its legal profession.
41. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1965).
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does an absolute quarantine, and they do serve similar interests in
that they protect the welfare and safety of American citizens. The
possible loss of life and property, especially when measured against
the minor inconvenience of airport searches, seem sufficient to constitute a compelling governmental interest in conducting airport
searches. As one court concluded: "Any suggestion that the defendant's constitutional right to travel has been improperly interfered
with would be amusing in other circumstances. We are trying to
assure that right for the public and the resulting inconvenience for
the few should at least be tolerable."42
The objections raised under the sixth amendment and the right
to travel have not been considered seriously by the courts, but have
been dismissed rather perfunctorily.43 A much more difficult problem
is posed by the prohibitions of the fourth amendment. The preliminary question is whether the fourth amendment applies to airport
searches, which are typically conducted by private employees in a
public place and do not involve an intrusion into the office or home
of the person searched. In many respects the Court's interpretation
of the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures is unclear.44 There is general agreement, however, that
its fundamental purpose is "to safeguard the privacy and security
of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."46
Early interpretations emphasized that the amendment prohibited
governmental intrusions into "the sanctity of a man's home and
privacies of life."46 Over the years, however, the interpretation has
been expanded. The Supreme Court has now concluded that the
amendment "protects people, not places"47 and rejected the idea that
42. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991
(1972). It must be remembered that the right to travel is an individual right. How•
ever, in light of the potential loss of life and property that airport searches prevent,
there is ample governmental interest in conducting airport searches.
•~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a~

991 (1972).
44. Even the Supreme Court admitted in one recent fourth amendment case that
"(o]f course, it would be nonsense to pretend that our decision today reduces Fourth
Amendment law to complete order and harmony. The decisions of the Court over the
years point in differing directions and differ in emphasis. No trick of logic will make
them all perfectly consistent." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971).
45. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
46. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). The Court has stated that the
essence of the offense against the fourth amendment
[i]s not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers ••• but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property •••• Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers
are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of
a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict
him of a crime or forfeit his goocfs, is within the condemnation of that judgment,
In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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a "search" is limited to physical intrusions into the area to be
searched.48 The Court has also recognized that the fourth amendment
may protect an individual's justifiable expectations of privacy even
in an area accessible to the public.49
The frisks and the inspection of hand baggage are clearly' covered
by the term "search" as defined for fourth amendment purposes.
There may still be a question as to whether the term is appropriately
applied to the use of the profile and the magnetometer alone. It is
difficult to argue that the use of the hijacker profile constitutes a
search in and of itself, since it involves no physical intrusion.50 Similarly, although the magnetometer detects the presence of metal on
or about the passenger's body, there is no physical contact with 1;lie
passenger.51 However, several cases have now held that the use of the
magnetometer alone does constitute a search -within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.52 In nonairport-search cases the ~ourts have
accepted the idea that electronic eavesdropping with no physical
intrusion may constitute a search where the individual has a re_as~mable expectation of privacy; 53 the use of the magnetometer is a similar
electronic surveillance. However, since the use of the magnetometer
is less intrusive than more traditional searches, the courts· have found
that its use may b~ justified on less stringent grounds.54
Nor should the fact that private persons may be involved in conducting airport searches exempt the searches from fourth 'amendment
coverage. It is true that the amendment's "origin and history clearly
show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of
sovereign authority, and was not intended to pe a limitation upon
other than government agencies."55 When federal agents are _dir_ectly
involved, even if the search is conducted jointly with airline per48. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
49. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
50. United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1183 (3d Cir. 1972). One cause for con7
cern, however, is that the too-ready acceptance of the use of the profile; mig,ht, ·if
carried to its logical extreme, serve as a precedent to justify using statistical methods
to predict who might commit a crime, so that such individuals could be arrested in
advance and preventively detained. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, HOO
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 676 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 991 (1972) (Mansfield, J., concurring).
51. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1085 (E.D.N.Y•. 1971).
52. E.g., United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, ll82 (3d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
53. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967): "rrJhe reach of [the Fourth]
Amendment cannot tum upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into
any given enclosure.''
'
54. United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972); United States, v.
Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
55. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). These now include not only federal,
but also state governmental agencies, because the fourth amendment has been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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sonnel or private security guards, the courts will clearly regard it as
involving state action,56 and when the government's involvement in a
particular search is merely "peripheral" that also should be sufficient
to qualify it as a government search for the purposes of the fourth
amendment,57 for the search procedures were not only developed
56, Corngold v. United States, 267 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966).
57. United States v. Guest, 282 U.S. 745, 755·56 (1966). The existence of governmental action has been extensively discussed in cases involving airline freight or
package service. See, e.g., Clayton v. United States, 413 F,2d 297 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967); United
States v. :Blum, 329 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); United States V,
Thoreson, 281 .F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Cal. 1967), revd. on other grounds, 428 F.2d 654
(9th Cir. 1972). These cases may be read to suggest that federal agents must actively
instigate, initiate, or participate in a particular search in order for it to be governed
by the fourth amendment. However, they can be distinguished from the antihijacking
passenger search situation because they all involved searches of freight or of packages
shipped with common carriers who had explicitly reserved the right to inspect anything that they transported.
Two cases have found that no government action was involved in airport searches,
In United States v. Mitchell, 252 F. Supp. 28 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the court simply asserted
that
[a]irport "search" cases hardly invoke Fourth Amendment standards. The context
is not basically a citizen-to-government context, and invocation of the Fourth
Amendment appears as an almost gratuitous consequence of the presence in the
background of governmental air safety regulation and of the governmental
provision at airports of :peace officers to apprehend people found actually com•
mitting or attempting cnmes. The real problem is to assure the safe transit of
private persons on privately owned aircraft.
352 F. Supp. at 42. No judicial or statutory support is offered for this analysis.
A second case, United States v. Wilkerson, 478 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1978), offers a
more sophisticated statement of this position. In that case, a young woman purchased
a ticket in San Diego to travel on a flight to St. Louis. She checked two bags and
then asked directions to the restroom. After the plane had left the loading gate,
officials discovered that she had never boarded. Since airline regulations require that a
passenger accompany his checked baggage and since the woman had partially fit the
hijacker profile, the plane was recalled, and the two bags were searched by airline
employees; plastic bags containing vegetable matter were discovered. Police officers
were called in, and it was ascertained that the bags contained marijuana. The luggage
was shipped to St. Louis, and defendant was arrested there when he picked them up.
In this case, the court relied on two other cases that it bad recently decided and
asserted that "[t]hese tw·o cases stand for the proposition that searches of luggage by
airline employees are private searches that are invulnerable to fourth amendment
attack so long as the searches are conducted by the carrier for its own purpose and
without the instigation or participation of government officers." 478 F.2d at 815, citing
United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3195
(U.S., Oct. 9, 1972), and United States v. :Burton, 475 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1972).
It is not clear that the search in Wilkerson was conducted solely "by the carrier
for its own purpose." Judge Heaney, concurring on the ground that there was probable
cause for the search, pointed out:
As of March 9, 1972, each airline was required to adopt a security program with
respect to checked baggage •••• These regulations which were in effect when
this search was made but not when the Echols and Burton searches were made
remove any doubt as to the government's involvement in this search. Even though
the search here was conducted by airline personnel, it was carried out at the
instigation and direction of the government ••••
478 F.2d at 816-17. In addition, both Echols and Burton are distinguishable on their
facts. In Echols, an airline employee, acting pursuant to airline regulations, opened
an unclaimed suitcase, solely for the purpose of identifying the owner. In Burton, au
airline ticket agent became suspicious because the defendant fit the hijacker profile
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and implemented with government assistance, but are also required
by FAA regulation. 58
Once it is determined that the airport searches are subject to the
fourth amendment, the court must determine if they are permissible
within the terms of the amendment. The general rule in this area is
"that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions." 59 Searches that fall within the exceptions must still be reasonable, although they are not subject to
the requirement that a warrant be procured upon a showing of
probable cause. 00 There are, of course, no warrants involved in
airport antihijacking searches as the system now exists; the nature of
the procedure is such that there is no time in which to procure them.
Further, even if there were time, in most situations the airport
officials could not meet the level of probable cause required for a
normal search warrant, since the only evidence available before the
magnetometer is employed would be the £act that the passengers
had met the profile. This fact in itself is not "sufficient ... to warrant
a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense . . . is being
committed, " 61 for fewer than one in fifteen of those selected by the
profile have proved to be carrying weapons.62
Many of the existing exceptions to the warrant requirement
clearly have no relevance to airport searches. For instance, a search
incident to a lawful arrest is constitutional without a warrant, provided that it is limited to the arrestee's person and the area within
his immediate control.63 However, an airport search typically involves
no arrest at all. If an arrest does take place it is preceded by and
caused by the search, a relationship that is insufficient to justify the
search as "incident to a lawful arrest." 64 It could be argued that the
antihijacking search itself constitutes a temporary arrest, especially
when it includes a search of hand-baggage or a frisk. No court has
ruled on the point, but the search would not appear to meet the
comm.on standards for arrest, which require that the detention be
"performed with the intention to effect an arrest, and [be] so understood by the person detained." 65
and because the weight distribution of one of his checked bags seemed unusual. On
his own initiative, the agent obtained a skeleton key and opened the bags, where he
discovered the contraband.
58. See text accompanying notes 9-12 &: 22 supra.
59, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
60. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
61. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967).
62. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
63. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
64. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968).
65. Jenkins v. United States, 161 F.2d 99, 101 (10th Cir. 1947).

138

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:128

Other exceptions to the warrant requirement that were made for
certain exigent circumstances seem similarly inapplicable. For instance, no visible offense that might justify a search66 is being committed in the presence of a police officer. Nor can airport searches
be justified as incident to the "hot pursuit" of a fleeing felon. 61 There
is no danger that necessary evidence will be destroyed before a warrant can be procured. 68 Nor can airport searches be assimilated into
the exception for inventory searches, which are conducted by the
police after an arrest in order to account for the suspect's belongings. 00
There are four other situations in ,vhich a warrantless search may be
allowed, all of which have been suggested as possible grounds for
approving the present airport search system.

I
Border searches, which are typically conducted without a warrant,
do not constitute an exception to the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment; they have never been viewed as subject to the
limits of the fourth amendment at all. Since 1789, customs officials
have been authorized by statute to search, without a warrant or a
specific demonstration of probable cause, anyone entering the United
States. 70 The Court has reasoned that, since the authorizing statute
was passed by the same Congress that proposed the Bill of Rights
for ratification by the states, border searches were never intended
to be included within the prohibition of the amendment. 71 In Witt
v. United States, 72 the ninth circuit, following this reasoning, held
that there was reasonable and probable cause to search every person
entering the United States by reason of that entry alone. In a later
case, the same court found that a border search need not be based on
probable cause; "unsupported" or "mere" suspicion was found
sufficient.73
The rationale of the border search cases is not directly applicable
66. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
67. See Warden v. Hayden, 378 U.S. 294 (1967).
68. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
69. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1966).
70. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43. Currently, custt,.wll officials arc
allowed "to conduct a search, without warrant, of the person, and of the personal
effects in the possession of any person seeking admission to the United States, con•
cerning whom [such official] may have reasonable cause to suspect that grounds e.xist
for exclusion from the United States ••••" 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (1970), Sec generally
Note, In Search of the Border: Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and Immigration Officers, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. &: POL. 93 (1972).
71. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
72. 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1961).
73, Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
977 (1966).
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to antihijacking searches, for the border search procedures are used
to search people before they enter the United States; they could not
be used to screen people who board planes within the United States
and who do not intend to cross any national borders. However, on a
policy level, there are many similarities between airport searches and
border searches. The special standards applied to border searches are
"based on policy considerations which recognize the difficult problems of effectively policing ... national boundaries"74 and the overriding public interest in preventing contraband and illegal aliens
from entering the country.75 The marshals that assist in airport
searches probably incur even greater policing problems with regard
to time and urgency than do customs officials, and the public interest
in stopping air piracy is certainly as compelling as that in protecting
the borders.
In a recent line of cases, the fifth circuit has upheld airport
searches by analogizing to border searches. Initially, in a case involving the search of a person who had not yet reached the boarding area,
the court merely mentioned that the gravity of the danger in the
two situations was analogous.76 More recently, the court explicitly
accepted border search standards as appropriate to airport searches
when the person searched has actually presented himself for boarding; in United States v. Skipwith,77 the court held that "the standards
for initiating a search of a person at the boarding gate should be no
more stringent than those applied in border crossing situations." 78
74. Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967).
75. Historically, this broad power has been limited to searches of people entering
the country. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). There is no provision covering
travelers who remain within the United States, and there is confusion concerning
people leaving the country. According to one commentator, the Chief of Customs
Control at Kennedy Airport claimed that the Munitions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 40l(a) (1970),
and the Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (expired Dec. 31, 1969), empowered customs officials to search all departing international travelers. Note, Airport
Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 C_ouJM. L. REv. 1039, 1051 (1971).
In United States v. Marti, 321 F. Supp. 59 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), the court concluded that
warrantless "exit searches" are permissible under the fourth amendment, but that
probable cause is required to justify them. The court referred to the "strong national
interest in providing a reasonable yet effective" way of searching the baggage of
departing passengers because of the "current terror attacks and hijackings of civil
aircraft." 321 F. Supp. at 65.
76. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973). The defendant in the
case had been found with heroin during an airport search. The court upheld the
search on an e.xtension of the stop-and-frisk rule announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). See text accompanying notes 105-11 infra. However, in the course of its
discussion, the court noted the similarities between the airport search and the
border search, which has "always been exempt from the usual fourth amendment
requirements." 475 F.2d at 51 &: n.8. The court added however, that "[o]ur discussion
of border searches is by way of analogy. We do not propose to substitute the 'suspicion standard' applicable in border search cases for the Terry v. Ohio standard
which is the basis for our decision." 475 F.2d at 51 n.8.
77. No. 72-1932 (5th Cir., June 14, 1973) (excerpted in 42 U.S.L.W. 2018).
78. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 7.
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The court weighed three factors in determining whether a standard
less strict than the usual requirement that probable cause be demonstrated was appropriate. First, it noted that the public need to prevent
air piracy is "judicially-recognized."79 Second, it indicated that the
procedures appear to be "the most efficacious that could be used." 80
Third, the court insisted that the degree of intrusion into the privacy
of the person made by airport and border searches was far less
offensive than that made by similar searches in other contexts, although it still represented a not insubstantial burden on the travelling public. The court pointed out that there is no social or moral
stigma attached to a search at a boarding gate and that the individuals
searched have entered the search area voluntarily and with knowledge
that they would be searched. 81 The court also argued that the public
and supervised nature of airport searches and the desire of the airline
companies to avoid harassment of and inconvenien.;e to their passengers further minimize the possibility of abuse. The Skipwith
court concluded that it is reasonable to allow searches of "those who
actually present themselves for boarding on an air carrier, like those
seeking entrance into the country," on the basis of "mere or unsupported suspicion. "82
Skipwith overlooks the fact that, although the analogy between
border and airport searches may be close and the policy considerations quite similar, the border search doctrine was originally based
on specific legislation that indicated that the framers of the fourth
amendment did not intend to require a warrant for such searches.
The exception was not simply established by judicial fiat. Moreover,
the Constitution restricts the ability of government to limit interstate
travel,83 which is involved in most airport searches, while it does
permit extensive regulation of travel into84 or out of the country,8G
which is involved in border searches. Almeida-Sanchez v. United
79. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 6.
80. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 6.
81. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 6-7. The court stressed that the search was not "cx.traordinary or unexpected" because "Skipwith came to the specific part of the air•
port where he knew or should have known all citizens were subject to being searched,"
No. 72-1932, slip op. at 4.
82. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 8.
83. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972): Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
84. The power of Congress to deal with foreign affairs, which is inherent in the
sovereignty of the United States, supports the many immigration laws that regulate
the entry, sojourn, and departure of aliens. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530
(1954); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTlTtJTION 74-75 (1972).
85. The right of Congress to regulate travel out of the country by passing a statute
that makes it illegal for a United States citizen to leave the country without a valid
passport is also rooted in the power of Congress to enact legislation to regulate
foreign affairs. See Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386, 393 (5th Cir. 1964).
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States, 86 a 1973 Supreme Court decision regarding border searches,
stresses the strict limitations of the original exception and refuses to
extend them. It is unlikely that many lower courts will, so soon after
the Supreme Court's admonition, follow Skipwith in extending the
rela."<ed border search standards to airport searches.
Congress may be willing to pass legislation-similar to that authorizing reduced standards for border searches-that expressly exempts airport searches from the requirements of procuring a warrant
or demonstrating probable cause. Such legislation would not have the
presumption of validity contained in the original border search law
because it would not have been adopted contemporaneously with
the fourth amendment. As a result, any legislation is likely to be no
more than a futile attempt to modify a constitutional prohibition
by statute.

II
In certain situations that are admittedly subject to the fourth
amendment the Court has carved out exceptions to the warrant requirement upon a showing that a compelling governmental interest
exists and that a warrant cannot be obtained without frustrating the
purpose of the search. However, the Court has " 'specifically established' and '. . . jealously and carefully drawn' " 87 the purpose and
scope of each exception. The facts in each case must be carefully
scrutinized to determine whether they are sufficiently similar to the
facts upon which the Supreme Court focused in authorizing the
original exception.
Administrative searches, such as fire, health, and safety inspections, used to be considered to be a general exception to the warrant
requirement. 88 In the 1967 case of Camara v. Municipal Court, 89
however, the Supreme Court considerably limited the right of government officials to conduct administrative searches without a warrant. 00 In that case the Court, for the first time, expressly used a
86. 41 U.S.L.W. 4970 (U.S., June 21, 1973).
87. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971), quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) and Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
88. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
89. 387 U.S. 523 (1957).
90. The appellant had refused to allow city building inspectors to enter his apartment without a warrant. As a result, the city brought criminal charges against him
for violating the housing code by refusing to permit a legitimate inspection. While
awaiting trial, he petitioned for a writ of prohibition, arguing that the ordinance
authorizing warrantless inspections was unconstitutional on its face as a violation
of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. In its decision the Supreme Court specifically overruled Frank v. Maryland and ruled that under the facts as alleged petitioner's writ should be granted. The Court held that under the fourth amendment
defendant had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors procure a search
warrant.
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balance-of-interests analysis to decide a fourth amendment question.
Weighing governmental necessity against the citizen's right to privacy, the Court held that a lessee could insist that a warrant be
produced for an inspection of his apartment, even though the inspection was conducted for a legitimate governmental purpose. However,
the probable cause standard that would make such a search "reasonable" was "reduced" from that used in the ordinary criminal case:
The court would be allowed to consider the general condition of the
neighborhood, rather than merely the condition of the particular
building, in determining if probable cause to search exists. Furthermore, the Court indicated that in emergency situations, where the
government interest is sufficiently urgent or the delay occasioned by
obtaining the warrant would frustrate the proper purpose, of the
search, a warrantless administrative search would still be permissible.91
In three recent cases, the Court indicated certain factors that
might lead it, despite the Camara rule, to approve an administrative
search in the absence of a warrant. In Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States,92 the Court found that, in an industry that, like the
liquor industry, has a long, history of federal regulation, Congress
has broad powers to "fashion standards of reasonableness" 93 with
regard to searches. In Colonnade, however, Congress had made the
imposition of a fine the exclusive sanction for refusal to permit entry
for inspection and did not authorize forcible entry without a warrant.
In United States v. Biswell,94 the premises searched without a warrant were the storeroom of a licensed gun deale1 In upholding the
search, the Court found that, although "[f]ederal regulation of the
interstate traffic in firearms is not as deeply rooted in history as is
governmental. control of the liquor industry, . . . close scrutiny of
this traffic is undeniably of central importance to federal efforts to
prevent violent crime and to assist the States in regulating the firearms traffic within their borders." 95 It also noted that the intrusion
on the individual's privacy was not objectionable, for the dealer had
chosen to enter the business with knowledge of the mandatory inspection procedures.96
91. 387 U.S. at 538-39. For a perceptive !lnalysis of the halting development of this
interests-balancing approach, see Greenberg,· The Balance of Intel'ests Theory and the
Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and
See, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1011 (1973). Greenberg argues that the balancing test approach
introduced in Camara and Terry has great potential for resolving difficult fourth
amendment questions, but he points out that the Supreme Court haS failed to use
it since those two cases.
92. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
93. 397 U.S. at 77.
94. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
95. 406 U.S. at 315.
96. 406 U.S. at 316.
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In Wyman v. ]ames,91 the plaintiff, a former recipient of Aid-toFamilies-with-Dependent-Children payments, contested a state law
that conditioned the receipt of future benefits on the recipient's
consent to periodic home visits by caseworkers. The question of the
validity of the visits was not raised directly, for when plaintiff refused
to allow them, no forcible entry was made; instead, her welfare
benefits were terminated. The Court held that the home visits were
not "searches" ·within the meaning of the fourth amendment, but
were merely of an interview nature. 98 However, it also concluded
that the visits would not be proscribed by the fourth amendment as
"unreasonable" even if they were "searches." 99 The warrant requirement was found inappropriate, for it "necessarily would imply conduct either criminal or out of compliance with an asserted governing
standard."100 In determining whether the visit in ·question was reasonable under fourth amendment standards the Court considered
the purpose of the visit (which was not to get criminal information,
but to ensure that the government's objective of benefiting the child
was being served), the efficacy of alternative means of accomplishing
that purpose, the degree of intrusion on the homeowner's rights, and
the widespread use of the practice in other states.101
A few recent decisions have upheld the constitutionality of airport
searches on the basis of administrative search standards, pointing out
that both are conducted as part of general regulatory schemes in
furtherance of legitimate administrative purposes.102 However, the
analogy does not appear to be appropriate. If the Camara rule were
to be applied, the present airport search system would not meet its
standards. No provision is presently made to obtain a warrant if one
is demanded, and the delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant would
effectively frustrate the purpose of the search, which is to promote
the smooth and uninterrupted progress of safe air travel. If a warrant
is sought, even the Camara stancfard of "reduced" probable cause will
not be met. In the current inspection system, all passengers are
searched by magnetometer; no evidence is produced that would indicate that violations of the law might exist in the "area" or group
searched. If the profile were still used as a screening device, it might
meet the Camara standard, but even under the original airport search
system the profile was not used to support the issuing of a warrant.
Nor do the airport searches fall within the exceptions to the
Camara rule suggested by the later cases. The relaxed requirements
97. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
98. 400 U.S. at 317-18.
99. 400 U.S. at 318.
100. 400 U.S. at 324•.
101. 400 U.S. at 317-24.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908-12 (9th Cir. 1973).
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of all three post-Camara cases discussed above were specifically outlined in statutes. The airport system, in contrast, is required, not by
legislation, but by regulations promulgated by a federal agency.
Moreover, Colonnade and Biswell involve the inspection of businesses with a long history of government regulation. The aviation
industry has been regulated almost since its inception, but the individual whose privacy is invaded by the search is not the regulated
businessman, as in Colonnade and Biswell, but merely a passenger,
who has not chosen "to engage in [a] pervasively regulated business
. . . with the knowledge that [he] will be subject to effective inspection."103 The airport searches are not similar to the welfare visits in
Wyman, for the former are primarily intended to gather information
relating to criminal activity and are thus more likely to lead to
criminal prosecution than are the welfare visits. Also, the scope of the
airport search extends to the individual's person and in this respect
is more intrusive than an inspection of a room or a dwelling.
It could be suggested that airport searches fit into the exception
for emergency situations left open in Camara. The system now in use
cannot be so justified, however, for it is part of an ongoing regulatory
process and is not limited to emergency circumstances.

III
Most of the cases104 that have upheld the airport search procedures have relied on a broad interpretation of the "stop-and-frisk"
doctrine enunciated in Terry v. Ohio.105 Terry dealt with the admissibility of evidence found in the course of a stop and frisk rather
than with the validity of the search itself, but, as the Court said, "A
ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial . . . has the necessary
effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence.''100
103. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Legato, 42 U.S.L.W. 2019 (5th Cir., June 14, 1973);
United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Slocum, 464
F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972): United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 947 (1972); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United
States v. Ware, 315 F. Supp. 1333 (D.C. Okla. 1970).
105. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, an experienced police officer observed Terry and
one of his codefendants walking up and down a street, peering intently into one
particular store window, and then meeting to talk at a street corner where they were
joined by the other defendant. The officer suspected that they were planning a robbery
and thought that they might be armed; he approached the three men, identified him•
self as a police officer, and asked for their names. They "mumbled something," and the
officer grabbed Terry, spun him around, and patted down his clothing. He felt a
bulge in the coat pocket, which proved to be a pistol. Terry was charged with carrying
a concealed weapon, and at trial he moved to suppress the gun as evidence discovered
incident to an illegal search. The trial court denied Terry's motion and found him
guilty. That decision was sustained by an Ohio intermediate court, the Ohio supreme
court, and the United States Supreme Court.
106. 392 U.S. at 13.
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The Court found that an investigatory stop and a limited frisk
(patting down the outer clothing of a person for weapons) is justified
when a police officer "has reason to believe that he is dealing with
an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has
probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime."107 The Court
stressed that no frisk could be justified on the basis of mere "inarticulate hunches"108 and that the searching officer would have "to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts [would] reasonably warrant [the]
intrusion."109 In determining that the "reasonableness" requirement
had been satisfied, the Court used a balancing test as it had in evaluating the degree of probable cause required in Camara. The Terry
Court admitted that even a frisk constituted a serious invasion of
personal privacy,110 but it felt that the search was justified in the
circumstances by the interest of the individual policeman in protecting himself and others from imminent harm.m
In Adams v. Williams,11 2 the latest stop-and-frisk case, the Court
has apparently relaxed the requirement that "specific and articulable
facts" be shmrn. Approving a stop and frisk that was conducted
entirely on the basis of a tip from an unidentified informant known
to the officer,113 the Court said that the officer had "ample reason to
fear for his safety" because the investigation occurred in a high crime
area in the early morning when the officer was alone on patrol.114
The first case that extended the stop-and-frisk doctrine to airport
searches was United States v. Lindsey.115 Although the search in
question occurred in an airport and was carried out by a special air
marshal, neither the profile nor the magnetometer was used. Rather,
defendant was questioned because his nervous and unusual behavior
in the boarding lounge aroused the suspicions of the marshal and
the ticket clerk.116 The court held that, although "the level of sus107. 392 U.S. at 27.
108. 392 l.T.S. at 22.
109, 392 U.S. at 21.
110. 392 U.S. at 24-25.
111. 392 U.S. at 24, 27. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a companion
case to Terry, the Court underscored the limited nature of the stop-and-frisk excep•
tion to the warrant requirement. The circumstances in that case were very similar
to those in Terry, but the Court held the contraband seized inadmissible because
the search was clearly motivated by the officer's desire to discover drugs, rather than
by his need for self-protection.
112, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
113. 407 U.S. at 144-45.
114. 407 U.S. at 147-48.
115, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972).
116. The defendant gave a different name than that which appeared on his ticket.
When the marshal asked him for identification, he produced two cards, in two other
names. The marshal observed bulges in the defendant's coat pockets and, fearing
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picion in the instant case is lower than in Terry, it was sufficiently
high to justify" the limited, protective; pat-down search in view of
the possible danger of a airline hijacking and the limited time in
which the marshal had to act.117 These circumstances would seem
to meet the requirement of "specific and articulable facts."
United States v. Lopez118 was the first case to hold that the use
of the profile and the magnetometer to justify the frisking of a
passenger is constitutional under the Terry rationale. The court
stressed the effectiveness of the search procedures, the compelling
interest of the government in preventing hijackings, and the fact
that the Terry rule allows an officer to perform a frisk" 'in the belief
that his safety or that of others [is] in danger.' " 119 Although the
marshal in this case may not have been in any danger himself if the
defendant had been allowed to board, he was presumably performing
the frisk with the intention of protecting the other passengers.120
The court pointed out that "the probability that any person who is
selected to be frisked has a weapon is approximately 6%," a proportion that it concluded was sufficient to justify the frisk in the context of the great danger of hijacking.121
·
Lopez expressly did not discuss whether "the use of the magnetometer might be an objectionable intrusion were it not accompanied by an antecedent warning from the profile indicating a need
to focus particular attention on the subject."122 This question was
answered in United States v. Epperson,123 where the defendant was
frisked solely because he activated the magnetometer. The fourth
that the defendant might be armed, frisked him, and discovered packets of heroin.
451 F.2d at 702-03.
117. 451 F.2d at 703.
118. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). After the defendant was selected by airline
employees · as one who fit the hijacker profile, had activated the magnetometer as
he passed through it, and had failed to produce identification upon request, federal
marshals were summoned. When defendant again activated the magnetometer, again
failed to produce any identification, and admitted that the name on his ticket was
erroneous, the marshal frisked him for weapons. The marshal felt a hard bulge, large
enough to be a pistol. It proved to be an envelope tightly packed with heroin. Lopez
was arrested and charged with concealing and transporting narcotics. 328 F. Supp. at
1081-82. The court found that the antihijacking search system used was highly effective
and held that it was not unconstitutional. However, they found that, in this particular
instance, an airline official had, without authority, issued an order modifying the
profile by adding an ethnic element for which there was no experimental basis. Since
the defendant might have been selected by this altered profile, the court held that
his constitutional rights had been violated. They therefore granted his motion to
suppress and dismissed the indictment against him. 328 F. Supp. at 1101,02. See discussion in note 24 supra.
119. 328 F. Supp. at 1096, quoting 392 U.S. at 27.
120. 328 F. Supp. at 1097.
121. 328 F. Supp. at 1097.
122. 328 F. Supp. at IIOO.
123. 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
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circuit held that the use of a magnetometer did constitute a "search"
under the fourth amendment, but that, under the Terry doctrine,
the search was reasonable. It suggested that the warrant requirement
was set aside in Terry because of the limited scope and purpose of
the search, the element of danger, and the necessity for swift action;
the court found this case similar in that "[t]he danger is so wellknown, the governmental interest so overwhelming, and the inva~ion
of privacy so minimal, that the warrant requirement is excused by
exigent national circumstances."124
In his concurring opinion in United States v. Bell,125 Judge
Friendly of the second circuit court of appeals relied on Terry and
suggested that the great danger from hijacking would in itself justify
as reasonable not only the use of the magnetometer, but also more
intrusive searches:
I would not wish us to be understood as implying that searches of
airplane passengers are lawful only . . . where a person first meets
a "profile," ... and then activates a magnetometer ... ·
... When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives
and millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the
purpose of preventing hijacking ... and with reasonable scope and
the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such
a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.126
This view has not as yet found wide acceptance; Judge Mansfield
concurred separately for the express purpose of disagreeing with
Judge Friendly's position:
I do not share the view that [airplane hijacking] justifies a broad and
intensive search of all passengers, measured only by the good faith of
those conducting the search, regardless of the absence of grounds for
suspecting that the passengers searched are potential hijackers.
. • . [T]he ultimate strength of our constitutional guarantees lies
in their unhesitating application in times of crisis and tranquility
alike.1 21
The district court in United States v. Mitchell128 drew from
Judge Friendly's concurrence authority for its conclusion that the
fourth amendment was not applicable to airport searches ab~ent a
showing that the search in question was motivated by a governmental
interest in detecting crime, rather than a private interest in airplane
safety. The court said that
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

454
464
464
464
352

F.2d at 771.
F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
F.2d at 674-75.
F.2d at 675-76.
F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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the profile and magnetometer checks are not circumstances substituting for probable cause authorizing a Fourth Amendment search
for evidence of criminality or for contraband but rather are coarsescreening devices adopted as a convenient substitute for total search
of all passengers, flight personnel and baggage . . . . Those not
cleared for boarding are searched not as under positive suspicion or
as indicated by probable cause but simply because they are the only
ones of all those originally and still notionally subject to search who
have not been cleared for boarding through an unobtrusive but real
conceptual pat-down.120
The Terry rationale may have been appropriate in the early
cases that involved the original multilevel screening process, for
that system provided some, albeit a low, level of reasonable suspicion
to justify each successive search.130 Although the profile itself is not
intrusive enough to be a search, it may provide reasonable suspicion
to justify the use of the magnetometer, which is a search; the magnetometer, in tum, may justify any frisk deemed necessary. This
analysis, first advanced in Lopez, accepts an extremely low level of
"reasonable suspicion" by the Terry standard, which required
"specific and articulable facts," but it may be justified by the particularly compelling government interest involved.
A different question is presented by a case, like Epperson, that
arises under the new search procedures, for under these procedures
the initial screening by magnetometer is itself a search, yet is not
supported by reasonable suspicion.131 Epperson found the search
reasonable on the grounds that the government interest involved is
compelling and the personal intrusion slight; it claimed that this
rationale was merely an extension of Terry. However, it must be
pointed out once more that an essential requirement in Terry was
that the officer possess a reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts,
that the person searched is armed and presently dangerous. Magnetometer searches do not meet this requirement; they are applied indiscriminately to all passengers. The newest procedures go even
further, for they also require that the hand baggage of each passenger
be searched. Adams v. Williams132 may have relaxed the Terry standard, but in that case the officer's reasonable suspicion was still directed to a specific individual. In the airport search the objects of
suspicion are all passengers, the vast majority of whom are unlikely
to attempt a hijacking.
129. 352 F. Supp. at 43.
130. See, e.g., United States v. :Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
991 (1972); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
131. To have grounds for searches in these cases, it would be necessary to assume
that anyone who wishes to travel by airplane is, by virtue of that fact alone, under
reasonable suspicion. This argument is similar to one approach used in justifying
border searches. See Witt v. Uni_ted States, 287 F.2d 389, 891 (9th Cir. 1961).
132. See text accompanying notes 112-14 supra.
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If the courts do persist in extending the stop-and-frisk doctrine
to include airport searches, they will have to reach the question,
discussed at length in Terry, of the permissible scope of the search.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that even a search that is
reasonable at its inception may violate fourth amendment protections if its scope and intensity become intolerable.133 A search must
be reasonably limited by its objective.134 In the case of the antihijacker searches the objective is the discovery of weapons. The permissible scope of airport searches has not been definitively defined
by the courts that apply Terry to justify them, but there are few
cases on point. In United States v. Kroll,13 5 the scope of a search of
a passenger's briefcase was found to be unreasonably extended, although the general search of hand luggage was justified at the outset.
In that case, a suspicious marshal searched the contents of an ordinary business envelope that had a very small bulge at one end. The
court said that it was obvious from the testimony that at the time
that the marshal asked the defendant to empty the envelope, he was
searching, not for weapons of any kind, but for the contraband that
his trained intuition told him was there.136 The court said that this
went beyond the scope of a reasonable airport search, which is not
a "license for the wholesale exploration of a passenger's luggage and
its contents."137 United States v. Meulener,138 in contrast, found
that any search of hand luggage was unreasonable unless the passenger was first subjected to a frisk.139 The court based its finding
on Terry, which approved only a limited pat-down as an initial
step.14° Further intrusions, it said, may be justified only on the basis
of evidence discovered in the course of the frisk.141 These decisions
indicate that, even if airport searches are constitutional on the basis
of Terry, the scope of the present system may be found to be unreasonably broad.

IV
The doctrine of implied or express consent has also been relied
upon to justify antihijacking searches. Because consent to a search
133. See, e.g., Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
134. Harris v. United States, 151 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1945), afjd., 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
135. 351 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972), affd., 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973).
136. 351 F. Supp. at 150.
137. 351 F. Supp. at 152.
138. 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
139. The court also felt that the search was unreasonable because the defendant
was not given the opportunity to refrain from boarding the aircraft.
140. 351 F. Supp. at 1292.
141. But see United States v. Rivera, No. 72 CR 1309, slip op. at 10 (E.D.N.Y.,
May 22, 1973): "[I]he court ought not to second-guess an air-marshal as to the procedures that should precede a patdown of a passenger who meets the profile and who
had substantially activated the magnetometer."
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is a waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, the courts require
that "[s]uch a waiver or consent ... be proved by clear and positive
testimony, and . . . that there [be] no duress or coercion, actual or
implied .... The government must show a consent that is unequivocal and specific, and freely and intelligently given."142 Mere
verbal agreement does not create a conclusive presumption of consent.143 Since even the polite request of a uniformed official acting
under apparently lawful authority may have a coercive effect on the
average citizen, the courts have held that even such "lawful coercion" will usually invalidate consent or acquiescence to a search.144
In its last term, the Supreme Court appeared to relax the standards for establishing an effective consent. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte145 the Court refused to accept an argument that its earlier
cases required that the prosecution's proof of consent to a search
meet the strict standards of "an intentional relinquishment ... of
a knmm right.'' 146 It reasoned that such guarantees as the privilege
against compulsory sel£-incrimination147 and the right to counsel,148
which preserve the defendant's right to a fair criminal trial and
which do require proof of a "knowing and intelligent waiver," are
of an entirely different order from those rights guaranteed by the
fourth amendment. The Court found that, since the latter rights are
not essential to procedural fairness, the requirement of a knowing
waiver is inappropriate, and a less stringent standard can be used.140
The Court did not specifically describe what the appropriate standard would be, but it did state that the defendant's knowledge of his
right to refuse to be searched is only one factor to be considered in
determining if the consent was voluntarily given. 160 In that case,
142. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
143. Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
826 (1966).
144. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
145. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
146. 412 U.S. at 235-46.
147. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
148. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
149. Justice Marshall vigorously contested this conclusion in dissent:
I have difficulty in comprehending how a decision made without knowledge of
available alternatives can be treated as a choice at all•
. • • In the final analysis, the Court now sanctions a game of blindman's bluff,
in which the police always have the upper hand, for the sake of nothing more than
the convenience of the police. But the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment were
never intended to shrink before such an ephemeral and changeable interest. The
Framers of the Fourth Amendment struck the balance against this sort of con•
venience and in favor of certain basic civil rights. It is not for this Court to
restrike that balance because of its own views of the needs of law enforcement
officers.
412 U.S. at 284, 289-90.
150. 412 U.S. at 248-49.
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the search was found to be constitutional when the defendant agreed
to it verbally, even though it had not been proved that he knew of
his right to refuse.
Before Schneckloth, the courts had held, in the few airport search
cases in which the question was raised, that mere verbal agreement
was insufficient to provide the necessary express consent.151 But the
court did find express consent in United States v. Legato,152 where
the defendant voluntarily allowed his bag to be searched after he
had been informed of his right to refuse.153 The present airport system is unlikely to meet the standards of express consent even after
Schneckloth, for at no point is the verbal or ·written assent of the
passenger obtained.
If the airport procedures were to be altered to obtain express
consent, the consent should be requested very early, probably at the
time that the airline ticket is purchased, in order to facilitate refusal
and allow the making of alternative plans. The ticket should specify,
in large and prominent type, that consent to be searched is "a condition to passage on this and every other airline."154 Although
Schneckloth may have made this unnecessary, as a further guarantee
that consent is made with knowledge the passenger could be provided with a separate consent form, which explains in specific and
nontechnical language the rights of the citizen under the fourth
amendment and the extent to which they are waived by the signing
of the form. 1111;
•
lt has been argued that a passenger who continues the boarding
process after reading a sign that states, "Passengers and Baggage
Subject to Search," has impliedly consented to the search. The
courts before Schneckloth uniformly rejected this suggestion and
found that at most there was acquiescence to the demands of the
marshals.156 Even if the courts were to apply the Schneckloth analysis
151. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284 (D.C. Cal. 1972); United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp.
749 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
152. 42 U.S.L.W. 2019 (5th Cir., June 14, 1973).
153. Legato did not arise in the course of the normal airport search. The defendant
was searched on the basis of an anonymous telephone tip that had warned airline
officials to watch for a man carrying a bomb in an orange shopping bag. Defendant
was searched because he was seen carrying an orange shopping bag containing a large
package. 42 U.S.L.W. at 2019.
154. See, e.g., Roe v. R.A. Naylor, Ltd., [1917) 1 K.B. 712, where it was held
that if an important contractual provision is placed in such a position on the document that a man of ordinary care and intelligence would not expect to find it there,
then that condition would not be binding. See generally 2 A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 288,
at 51-52 (1950).
155. It must be clear to the passenger that the separate consent form is a material
part of the contract for the ticket. See Jones v. Great Northern Ry., 68 Mont. 231,
217 P. 673 (1923). See generally 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 548 (rev. ed. 1960).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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to the requirement of proof of knowledge in cases of implied as well
as express consent, they are not likely to find implied consent in the
passenger's failure to turn back, for such behavior does not meet the
requirement, undisturbed by Schneckloth, that consent be specific
and unequivocal.
Even if the courts were to find that the obtaining of express
consent as detailed above provided a valid waiver, it could be argued
that the passengers are being forced to waive one constitutional
right, the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, in order
to exercise another, the right to travel. The Supreme Court has held,
in other contexts, that the exercise of one constitutional right may
not be conditioned on the waiver of another.157 However, as discussed above,158 the courts will probably find that the right to travel
has not in fact been infringed or that the infringement is permissible
because of the compelling state interest involved. As one judge has
noted, "There is no inherent right to travel to a certain place in a
particular aircraft. Accordingly, airline authorities may condition
the sale of a ticket or permission to board the airplane upon a person's consent to be searched for weapons, explosives, and the like."1uo
V
None of the existing exceptions to the warrant can be successfully adapted to validate the airport search system in its present form.
It might seem to be a relatively easy matter to obtain the consent of
the passengers in order to bring the procedures within the exception
for searches authorized by the persons searched. However, even such
a minor change may make a significant difference in terms of time
and expense when so many people must be processed, and the inconvenience to the passengers may actually be increased. Since mere
verbal assent may cause problems of proof, a written consent will
probably be necessary. If the consent is to be anything more than
a mere formality-and especially if pre-Schneckloth standards .are
applied-the extent of his fourth amendment rights and the full
import of the waiver must be explained to each passenger. This
procedure would impose a burden on the processing of passengers
far greater than the benefit it would confer.
Rather than imposing such a burden merely to fit airport searches
into an existing exemption to the warrant requirement, the courts
should create a new exception that would cover airport procedures
157. See, e.g., Dunn v. :Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972).
158. See text accompanying notes 29-42 supra. But see United States v. Lopez, 328
F. Supp. 1077, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1971): "Nor can the government properly argue that
it can condition the exercise of the defendant's constitutional right to travel on the
voluntary relinquishment of his Fourth Amendment rights."
159. United States v. Fern, No. 72-1284, slip op. at 7 (7th Cir., Sept. 20, 1973)
(Gordon, J., dissenting).
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as they now exist.160 Even if the present 'procedures are not considered inviolate, creating a special exception-rather than adapting
the system to meet the standards for proper consent-would allow
the courts to deal specifically with the unique problems of airport
searches in answering certain questions, such as what is the permissible scope of the search,161 whether there is a need for consent and
what sort of consent is required, and whether the search can be
avoided, once one has reached the point at which the search is to be
performed, by choosing not to board the aircraft.162 The interests of
the passenger could be accommodated to the greatest degree possible
consistent with the government's interest, for the courts could see
that the searches were no more intrusive than is reasonably necessary
under the specific circumstances, rather than holding them to standards formulated for other situations. Defining a new exception to
the warrant requirement would also preserve the integrity of the
existing exceptions, for it would avoid extending them beyond their
initial justifications to cover an entirely new fact situation.
There have already been guarded suggestions that a new exception for airport searches would be appropriate.163 In United States
v. Moreno, 164 for example, the court upheld a warrantless airport
search and declared that "[d]ue to the gravity of the air piracy problem, we think that the airport ... is a critical zone in which special
fourth amendment considerations apply." 165
It could be argued that creating yet another exception would
seriously undercut the fourth amendment, a process at least as dangerous as stretching the current exceptions too far. However, the
160. As of the end of its 1973 Term, the Supreme Court had not granted certiorari
in any airport search cases. See, e.g., United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3195 (U.S., Oct. 9, 1973); United States v. Riggs, 474
F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S., Oct. 9, 1973); United
States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United States
v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972); United States v.
Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972). However, as
the flood of cases continues and the disagreements between the circuits become more
pronounced, it is to be hoped that the Court will soon hear a case in this area.
161. See United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1291-92 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
162. See United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1289-91 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
163. To date, however, these suggestions have been inferential rather than direct,
as the courts have been mainly concerned with fitting airport searches into existing
case law. In one early case, the court justified an airport search as an extension of
the Terry rule but stated that "in the context of a possible .airplane hijacking with
the enormous consequences which may flow therefrom, and in .vie,v of the limited
time in which [the marshal] had to act, the level of suspicion required for a Terry
investigative stop and protective search should be lowered." United States v. Lindsey,
451 F.2d 701, 703 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972). See also United
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972),
discussed in text accompanying notes 122-24 supra.
164. 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973).
165. 475 F.2d at 51.
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exception would be to the warrant requirement, not to the fourth
amendment. It must be remembered that "what the Constitution
forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches
and seizures."166 In framihg a new exception the Court would merely
be determining that in the special circumstances a search is reasonable without a search warrant or a demonstration of probable cause.
The Court adopts a balancing analysis167 to determine whether
to exempt a certain kind of search from the warrant requirement.
Three factors are typically weighed: the nature and strength of the
government's need to search, the seriousness of the special enforcement problems involved, and the degree of intrusion that the search
would entail.
In considering the government's need to search, the Court has
felt that a police officer's ·need to protect himself in an immediately
dangerous situation is a sufficient justification for the stop-and-frisk
doctrine. In administrative searches, the government's need to perform fire and health inspections is not as immediately compelling, and
thus a warrant is generally required. The urgent need to prevent
airplane hijackings, which place large numbers of citizens in serious
danger, can cost millions of dollars in loss of equipment or in ransom money, and may have serious international effects, would
seem to fall in the former category.
With regard to enforcement problems, the Court has regularly
refused to approve a warrantless search simply because it was more
convenient for the police. However, "in applying the Fourth Amendment, the Court has seldom shown itself unaware of the practical
demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement."168
Most of the current exceptions to the warrant requirement are
grounded in special circumstances in which requiring a warrant
would be unreasonable because it would frustrate the purpose of
the search. For example, in the traditional stop-and-frisk situation,
where the lives of police officers or bystanders might be in immediate danger, it would be unreasonable to require that a warrant be
obtained and traditional probable cause be established; rather, it is
the duty of the officer to disarm the suspect and thus remove the
immediate danger before proceeding any further.100 Likewise, in
the administrative search cases it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to establish that there was sufficient probable cause to believe that
code violations existed in a particular building without first searching that building.170 Therefore, the courts are allowed to consider
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
,
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967).
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the general character of the neighborhood in deciding if probable
cause exists. Those making airport searches are under similar time
and investigatory constraints. They must pass upon a great number
of people in a very short period of time, and the variety of possible
hijackers plus their increasing inventiveness in hiding weapons and
explosives makes the task increasingly difficult. Since the potential
hijacker must be stopped· before he can board the aircraft and
threaten harm to other travelers, there is no time for the officer to
establish probable cause or to obtain a search warrant without detaining either the plane or the suspect passenger.
· Against the government's need to search and the special enforcement problems, the Court will balance the degree of intrusion that
the search entails: 171 Is the scope of the search so broad, even when
it is limited as much as possible consistent with its purpose, that the
invasion of privacy outweighs opposing interests? In Terry a patdown of the suspect's outer clothing was found to be both adequate
to remove the possible danger and sufficiently unintrusive. The use
of a magnetometer would seem to be less offensive than a patdown.
The search of carry-on luggage does go farther, but the passenger
has the option of checking all of his baggage and thus not having
it searched. Furthermore, ·since everyone who boards an aircraft will
be searched for weapons,172 the passenger who is searched is not
singled out for special and unexpected treatment and should therefore feel no particular embarrassment or discomfort.
If the courts feel that the intrusion caused by the present airport
system goes only so far as is absolutely necessary to effect the purpose
of the search, they are likely to find that the creation of a new exception to the warrant· requirement is appropriate. However, the fact
that fewer than nventy per cent of the arrests resulting from the
current search system have involved crimes related to hijacking173
may indicate that the system now in use is unnecessarily broad. The
suspicions that those conducting the searches are, at least in some
cases, using them as a pretext to uncover evidence of other crimes is
inevitable.174 The use of the system for fishing expeditions would
171. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947
(1972); United States v. Rivera, 72 CR 1309, slip 9p. at IO (E.D.N.Y., May 22, 1973).
172. See note 12 supra. New York Times, Nov. 1971, at I, col. 3 (late city ed.).
173. See note 6 supra.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38, 43-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
where the court noted that if a defendant can offer any evidence that the search in
his case was not actually directed entirely towards discovering weapons, the court
will carefully examine the circumstances of the search. In United States v. Kroll,
351 F; Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972), affd., 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973), the court refused
to admit the amphetamines discovered in defendant's briefcase during an airport
search. Although the search was justified at its inception, the marshal went beyond
its permissible scope and intensity when he searched a regular business envelope,
which could not have concealed a weapon, and discovered the drugs.
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be especially abusive in view of the vast number of citizens to which
it is applied.
Judge Aldrich, dissenting in United States v. Skipwith, 17G has suggested that a new exclusionary rule be devised for airport searches.
Judge Aldrich would exclude "extraneous materials [such as drugs]
not within the purpose of the search, but fortuitously discovered in
the passenger's possession, to support a criminal prosecution."170
Only weapons and explosives that could be used in hijacking an
airplane would be admissible, although the search itself would be
authorized. Judge Aldrich argued that such a rule would remove the
incentive for overzealous law officers to misuse the procedure without impairing the prevention of hijacking and would thus "guarantee to the public that the government is not using airport search
procedure for other purposes, an offensive thought to any innocent
person suffering the inconvenience."177
At least one state has already imposed a similar exclusionary
rule by statute.178 In an Illinois act making it a crime to board an
aircraft with a firearm, explosive, or lethal weapon,179 it is stipulated
that "any evidence of criminal activity found during [an airport]
search" ·will be admissible only for the purpose of establishing a
violation of that act.180 Evidence discovered in the course of an airport search "is inadmissible as evidence in any legal proceeding for
any other purpose."181
The enactment of such legislation ensures that, as a matter of
public policy, the search system will be used only to prevent possible
hijackings. When such legislation exists, the courts may be more
likely to create a special exception to the warrant requirement, for
the degree of intrusion might be reduced. It is unlikely, however,
that the courts will themselves create a new exclusionary rule in the
absence of legislation. They may be deterred by the fear that many
people caught with contraband would not be prosecuted for a
crime that they had clearly committed. However, in other cases the
inability to prosecute guilty individuals has been found to be an
acceptable price to pay for the preservation of an important constitutional right.182
175. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 17-21 (5th Cir., June 14, 1973).
176. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 17-18.
177. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 20.
178. Also, at least one commentator suggested a similar special extension of the
exclusionary rule soon after the Terry decision. He advocated the exclusion from
evidence of all contraband except weapons discovered during a frisk. Note, The
Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. R.Ev. 63, 185-86 (1968).
179. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 84-1 to -7 (Smith-Hurd 1970), as amended, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 84-6 to -7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973).
180. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 84-4 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
181. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 84-4 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
182. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960) (evidence seized in
violation of fourth amendment by state officers cannot be used in federal prosecution),

November 1973]

Notes

A much more significant deterrent to a court-created rule is the
fact that the suggested rule would be a significant extension of
the present exclusionary rule. The "plain view" doctrine now per.
mits the admission of any evidence unexpectedly discovered in the
normal course of an otherwise legal search,183 while the "exclusionary
rule" in its present form bars the admission only of evidence discovered in the course of a search that is itself illegal.18 4 The exclu
sion of only some of the evidence discovered in a legal search, as
the Shipwith dissent suggests, would be a dramatic extension of the
present rule. Moreover, the suggested rule, unlike the existing rule,
would not be related to the preservation of judicial integrity. As one
of its major purposes, the existing rule refuses to make the courts a
"party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens." 1 5
No such invasion would exist in airport cases if, as is suggested, the
search itself is justified. It is true that the suggested rule might
share the rationale of the present rule in that it deters the misuse of
the search procedure. However, the effectiveness of even the present
rule in deterring misuse has been called into question: "[I]t can be
fairly said of the Exclusionary Rule that it cannot be proved to have
a significant deterrent effect and this effect is not so inherently
likely that we can assume it to exist in the absence of proof."'8s6 In
a time when the value of the present rule is increasingly called into
question, it seems unlikely that the courts will extend it as suggested.
Rather, the courts should find that the present airport search system
is sufficiently unintrusive to allow the creation of a new exception
to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment in the light
of the compelling government interest in preventing airplane hijackings.

183. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.

217 (1960).
184. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 11.
185. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
186. Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L.
Rav. 736, 741 (1972). From the point of view of a defendant, deterrence may seem

irrelevant. He is interested in avoiding incarceration and the rule allows him to do so.

